SYNOPSIS
Private respondents security guards Fernando Caranto, Resty
Remittere, Reynaldo Rosales, Antonio Tapar, Narciso Claro, Siony Manos, Baldo
Viodor and Daway Wahab filed a complaint for several monetary claims and unfair
labor practice against the petitioner CMP Federal Security Agency, Inc.,
Carolina Piao and Ponciano Mabanta Sr.. Later, Fernando Caranto amended
his complaint to include illegal dismissal. The case was set for a
mandatory conference on March 29, 1994. After several resettings, the
labor arbiter directed the parties to submit their respective position papers
and other documentary evidence. During the hearing on May 23, 1994,
private respondents filed their position paper and other documents. On
the other hand, CMP moved for another postponement but it was denied by the
labor arbiter. The case was then deemed submitted for decision. But
on June 13, 1994 the CMP filed its position paper. On July 22, 1994, the
labor arbiter rendered a decision, ordering CMP to reinstate Caranto with full
backwages and to pay salary differential to all private respondents plus
attorney’s fee. On appeal, the petitioner questioned the decision of the
labor arbiter alleging, among others, that CMP did not submit any position
paper and it decided the case solely on the basis of the position paper and
evidence submitted by private respondents. However, the NLRC affirmed
with modification as to the monetary awards, the decision of the labor arbiter.
The petitioner then questioned the decision of the NLRC claiming that it was
denied due process.
Hence, this petition.
The Court ruled that a party before the Labor Arbiter which had a
chance to present its side during a period of more than one (1) month, and despite
repeated extensions of time given to enable it to present its position paper
still failed to meet its final deadline, cannot claim denial of due process if
subsequently the Labor Arbiter disregarded its position paper belatedly filed.
Further, where the party has had ample opportunity to
present its side of the controversy not only before the Labor Arbiter but also
before the NLRC on appeal, it cannot thereafter interpose lack of due process
for what the fundamental law abhors is simply the absolute absence of
opportunity to be heard.
The petition is DISMISSED.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; FINDINGS OF NLRC CONCLUSIVE. -- Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the NLRC, except when there is grave abuse of discretion, are practically conclusive on this Court. It is only when the NLRC's findings are bereft of any substantial support from the records that the Court may step in and proceed to make its own independent evaluation of the facts.
2. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR LAWS; TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; DISMISSAL; BURDEN OF PROOF RESTS ON EMPLOYER. -- In termination cases like the one before us, the burden of proving that the dismissal of the employee was for a valid or authorized cause rests on the employer and failure to discharge that duty would mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal. The same principle was reiterated by this Court in Golden Donuts, Inc. v. NLRC when it ruled that the employer carries the burden of proof in showing just cause for terminating the services of an employee. x x x To allow an employer to terminate the employment of his worker based merely on allegations without proof places the latter in an uncertain situation. He is at the sole mercy of his employer who, in this case, has emasculated his right to a security of tenure.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABANDONMENT; IMMEDIATE FILING OF COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL CONTRARY THERETO. -- Contrariwise, when Caranto was relieved from his post on 6 May 1994 he immediately pursued his claim against CMP by amending his complaint six (6) days after to include illegal dismissal among his charges. This can hardly be expected from one who has voluntarily abandoned his job, as claimed by CMP. The immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal against the employer is a clear indication that the employee has not given up on his work.
4. ID.; ID.; PROCEEDINGS BEFORE LABOR COURTS; TECHNICAL RULES OF EVIDENCE NOT CONTROLLING. -- Under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in any proceeding before the NLRC or the Labor Arbiter. Both are mandated to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; STANDARD OF DUE PROCESS MUST BE MET. -- While administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers, like the NLRC and Labor Arbiters, are free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, they are nonetheless bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. Hence, it is not legally objectionable, for being violative of due process, for the Labor Arbiter to resolve a case based solely on the position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties. The affidavits of witnesses in such case may take the place of their direct testimony.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY WHO FAILED TO PRESENT POSITION PAPER IN ITS DEADLINE COULD NOT CLAIM DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS. -- A party before the Labor Arbiter which had a chance to present its side during a period of more than one (1) month, and despite repeated extensions of time given to enable it to present its position paper still failed to meet its final deadline, cannot claim denial of due process if subsequently the Labor Arbiter disregarded its position paper belatedly filed.
7. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; ESSENCE OF DUE PROCESS. -- The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
8. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR LAWS; PROCEEDINGS BEFORE LABOR COURTS; DUE PROCESS PROPERLY OBSERVED; CASE AT BAR. -- Where, as in this case, the party has had ample opportunity to present its side of the controversy not only before the Labor Arbiter but also the NLRC on appeal, it cannot thereafter interpose lack of due process for what the fundamental law abhors is simply the absolute absence of opportunity to be heard.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERIODS FOR FILING OF PLEADINGS MUST BE FOLLOWED. -- Finally, while it may be true that in labor cases stringent rules of procedure may be dispensed with in the interest of justice, it does not mean that a party litigant is at liberty to completely disregard or ignore the rules, particularly those relating to the periods for filing of pleadings. In this connection, if we are to sustain petitioner's argument that it was denied due process when its position paper and documentary evidence were not considered by the Labor Arbiter in deciding the case, we will in effect put a premium on the undesirable practice of filing position papers late and only after the case has already been submitted for decision.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
R. R. Mendez Associates
for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Romulo B. Lopez for private respondents.