SYNOPSIS

Petitioner had worked with the private respondent Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) for 28 years before he was terminated. Prior to said termination, petitioner was asked to admit accountability for the church offerings collected by his wife in the amount of P15,078.10. Petitioner refused since it was private respondents Pastor Buhat and Eufronio Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect. Thereafter petitioner requested Pastor Buhat to convene the Executive Committee to settle the dispute between him and Pastor Rodrigo, but the latter denied the same, and heated arguments between the two ensued until petitioner banged the

attaché case of Pastor Buhat on the table, scattered the books and threw the phone. Later, an Executive Committee meeting was held where the non-remittance of church collections and the events that transpired were discussed. Subsequently, petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing therein grounds for the termination of his services. Petitioner then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and a decision was rendered in his favor. The SDA appealed the same to the NLRC and after much ado, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the case involved an ecclessiastical affair to which the State cannot interfere.

The case at bar did not concern a purely religious affair as to bar the State from taking cognizance thereof. What is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. There was no compliance of the requirement that there should be a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving the employee reasonable opportunity to explain his side. Here, petitioner was not given enough opportunity to properly prepare for his defense. At any rate, the validity of the dismissal cannot be sustained. There was no basis for the loss of confidence and breach of trust as it was petitioner’s wife who collected the money and failed to remit the same. On the ground of serious misconduct and commission of an offense against the person of the employer’s duly authorized representative, the same was unmeritorious as petitioner’s actuations cannot be considered grave enough to be considered as serious misconduct to merit the ultimate penalty of dismissal. Then also, there was no proof that petitioner committed gross and habitual neglect of duties. Hence, since petitioner was illegally dismissed, he is entitled to reinstatement with full backwages.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE; ELUCIDATED.- The rationale of principle of separation of church and state is summed up in the familiar saying, “Strong fences make good neighbors.” The idea advocated by this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and thus avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. The demarcation line calls on the entities to “render therefore unto Ceasar the things that are Ceasar’s and unto God the things that are God’s.” While the State is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs, the Church is likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters.

2. ID.; ID.; ECCLESIASTICAL AFFAIR; ELUCIDATED.- An ecclesiastical affair is “one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership.” Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To be concrete, examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious significance.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPRECIATED AS CASE AT BAR CONCERNS EMPLOYMENT PROBLEM.- The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar the State from taking cognizance of the same. While the matter at hand relates to the church and its religious minister it does not ipso facto give the case a religious significance. Simply stated, what is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. In this case, petitioner was not ex-communicated or expelled from the membership of the SDA but was terminated from employment. Indeed, the matter of terminating an employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious congregation.

4. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EMPLOYMENT; DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEES; PROVISIONS THEREOF APPLICABLE TO RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS.- Under the Labor Code, the provision which governs the dismissal of employees, is comprehensive enough to include religious corporations, such as the SDA, in its coverage. Article 278 of the Labor Code on post-employment states that “the provisions of this Title shall apply to all establishments or undertakings, whether for profit or not.” Obviously, the cited article does not make any exception in favor of a religious corporation. This is made more evident by the fact that the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, particularly, Section 1, Rule 1, Book VI on the Termination of Employment and Retirement, categorically includes religious institutions in the coverage of the law. Hence, the SDA cannot hide behind the mantle of protection of the doctrine of separation of church and state to avoid its responsibilities as an employer under the Labor Code.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION; ESTOPPEL; RAISING THE ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AFTER ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN TRIAL BELOW.- Private respondents are estopped from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal. It is already too late in the day for private respondents to question the jurisdiction of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter since the SDA had fully participated in the trials and hearings of the case from start to finish. The Court has already ruled that the active participation of a party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction. Thus, the active participation of private respondents in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC mooted the question on jurisdiction.

6. ID.; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RESPECTED; EXCEPTIONS; WHEN IT DIFFERS FROM THE FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER.- As a general rule, findings of fact of administrative bodies like the NLRC are binding upon this Court. A review of such findings is justified, however, in instances when the findings of the NLRC differ from those of the labor arbiter, as in this case. When the findings of NLRC do not agree with those of the Labor Arbiter, this Court must of necessity review the records to determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.

7. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EMPLOYMENT; DISMISSAL BY EMPLOYER; VALIDITY; REQUISITES.- In termination cases, the settled rule is that the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause rests on the employer. Thus, private respondents must not merely rely on the weaknesses of petitioner’s evidence but must stand on the merits of their own defense. The issue being the legality of petitioner’s dismissal, the same must be measured against the requisites for a valid dismissal, namely: (a) the employee must be afforded due process, i.e., he must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself, and; (b) the dismissal must be for a valid cause as provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code. Without the concurrence of this twin requirements, the termination would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOTICE OF TERMINATION; DISCUSSED.- Before the services of an employee can be validly terminated, Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code and Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code further require the employer to furnish the employee with two (2) written notices, to wit: (a) a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side; and, (b) a written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination. The first notice, which may be considered as the proper charge, serves to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought. The second notice on the other hand seeks to inform the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. This decision, however, must come only after the employee is given a reasonable period from receipt of the first notice within which to answer the charge and ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of a representative, if he so desires. This is in consonance with the express provision of law on the protection of labor and the broader dictates of procedural due process. Non-compliance therewith is fatal because these requirements are conditions sine qua non before dismissal may be validly effected.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; GROUNDS; BREACH OF TRUST; NOT APPRECIATED.- We cannot sustain the validity of dismissal based on the ground of breach of trust. Private respondents allege that they have lost their confidence in petitioner for his failure, despite demands, to remit the tithes and offerings amounting to P15,078.10, which were collected in his district. A careful study of the voluminous records of the case reveals that there is simply no basis for the alleged loss of confidence and breach of trust. Settled is the rule that under Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code, the breach of trust must be willful. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. It should be genuine and not simulated. This ground has never been intended to afford an occasion for abuse, because of its subjective nature. The records show that there were only six (6) instances when petitioner personally collected and received from the church treasurers the tithes, collections, and donations for the church. The stenographic notes on the witnesses’ testimony show that Pastor Austria was able to remit all his collections to the treasurer of the Negros Mission. Then, petitioner cannot be made accountable for the alleged infraction committed by his wife. After all, they still have separate and distinct personalities. For this reason, the Labor Arbiter found it difficult to see the basis for the alleged loss of confidence and breach of trust. The Court does not find any cogent reason, therefore, to digress from the findings of the Labor Arbiter which is fully supported by the evidence on record.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SERIOUS MISCONDUCT AND COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE AGAINST THE PERSON OF THE EMPLOYER’S DULY AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE; NOT APPRECIATED.- With respect to the grounds of serious misconduct and commission of an offense against the person of the employer’s duly authorized representative, we find the same unmeritorious and, as such, do not warrant petitioner’s dismissal from the service. Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. For misconduct to be considered serious it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Based on this standard, we believe that the act of petitioner in banging the attache case on the table, throwing the telephone and scattering the books in the office of Pastor Buhat, although improper, cannot be considered as grave enough to be considered as serious misconduct. After all, though petitioner committed damage to property, records show that he did not physically assault Pastor Buhat or any other pastor present during the incident. Hence, there is no basis for the allegation that petitioner’s act constituted serious misconduct or that the same was an offense against the person of the employer’s duly authorized representative. As such, the cited actuation of petitioner does not justify the ultimate penalty of dismissal from employment. While the Constitution does not condone wrongdoing by the employee, it nevertheless urges a moderation of the sanctions that may be applied to him in light of the many disadvantages that weigh heavily on him like an albatross on his neck. Where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may have been committed by the worker ought not be visited with a consequence so severe such as dismissal from employment. For the foregoing reasons, we believe that the minor infraction committed by petitioner does not merit the ultimate penalty of dismissal.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GROSS AND HABITUAL NEGLECT OF DUTIES; NOT APPRECIATED.- The final ground alleged by private respondents in terminating petitioner, gross and habitual neglect of duties, does not require an exhaustive discussion. Suffice it to say that all private respondents had were allegations but not proof. Aside from merely citing the said ground, private respondents failed to prove culpability on the part of petitioner. In fact, the evidence on record shows otherwise. Petitioner’s rise from the ranks disclose that he was actually a hard-worker. Private respondents’ evidence, which consisted of petitioner’s Worker’s Reports, revealed how petitioner travelled to different churches to attend to the faithful under his care. Indeed, he labored hard for the SDA, but, in return, he was rewarded with dismissal from the service for a non-existent cause.

12. ID.; ID.; ILLEGAL DISMISSAL; REINSTATEMENT AND BACKWAGES, PROPER.- In view of the foregoing, we sustain the finding of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner was terminated from service without just or lawful cause. Having been illegally dismissed, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and the payment of full backwages without any deduction corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Raul T. Montesino for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

Gemeno M. Ymballa for private respondents.