120715 : Syllabus

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; LIBEL; TEST TO DETERMINE THE DEFAMATORY CHARACTER OF WORDS; SATISFIED IN CASE AT BAR. - In libel cases, the question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but what the words used by him mean. Here, the defamatory character of the words used by the petitioner are shown by the very recitals thereof in the questioned article. No evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. Petitioner used the following words and phrases in describing the private complainant: “mandurugas,” “mag-ingat sa panlilinlang,” “matagal na tayong niloloko,” “may kasamang pagyayabang,” “ang ating pobreng super kulit,” “patuloy na kabulastugan,” “mastermind sa paninirang puri,” etc. Jurisprudence has laid down a test to determine the defamatory character of words used in the following manner, viz: “Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly made. Ironically and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander. A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue, or reputation, or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule. x x x.” This test was satisfied in the case at bench. Branding private complainant Reyes “mandurugas,” et al. most certainly exposed him to public contempt and ridicule. No amount of sophistical explanation on the part of petitioner can hide, much less erase, the negative impression already created in the minds of the readers of the libelous material towards private complainant. Respondent Court of Appeals is, thus, correct in holding that “these words and phrases (‘mandurugas,’ et al.) are indisputably defamatory for they impute upon the private complainant a condition that is dishonorable and shameful, since they tend to describe him as a swindler and/or a deceiver.”

2. ID.; ID.; THE BURDEN IS ON THE SIDE OF THE DEFENDANT TO SHOW GOOD INTENTION AND JUSTIFIABLE MOTIVE IN ORDER TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL INFERENCE OF MALICE. - The general rule laid down in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: “Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. x x x.” Prescinding from this provision, when the imputation is defamatory, as in this case, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of the defendant (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that the defendant’s imputation is malicious (malice in law). The burden is on the side of the defendant to show good intention and justifiable motive in order to overcome the legal inference of malice. Unfortunately, petitioner miserably failed to discharge this burden in the case before us.

3. ID.; ID.; A WRITTEN LETTER CONTAINING LIBELOUS MATTER CANNOT BE CLASSIFIED AS PRIVILEGED WHEN IT IS PUBLISHED AND CIRCULATED AMONG THE PUBLIC. - In Daez v. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 61 [1990]) we held that: “As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of any misconduct on the part of public officials, which comes to his notice, to those charged with supervision over them. Such a communication is qualifiedly privileged and the author is not guilty of libel. The rule on privilege, however, imposes an additional requirement. Such complaints should be addressed solely to some official having jurisdiction to inquire into the charges, or power to redress the grievance or has some duty to perform or interest in connection therewith.” In the instant case, none of the homeowners for whom the newsletter was published was vested with the power of supervision over the private complainant or the authority to investigate the charges made against the latter. Moreover, a written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among the public, as what the petitioner did in this case.

4. ID.; ID.; ANY ATTACK UPON THE PRIVATE CHARACTER OF THE PUBLIC OFFICER ON MATTERS WHICH ARE NOT RELATED TO THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS MAY CONSTITUTE LIBEL. - The rule is that defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of public officers which are related to the discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation. But any attack upon the private character of the public officer on matters which are not related to the discharge of their official functions may constitute libel. This is clear by express provision of Article 354, exception number two (2) which refers to “any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.” A perusal of the petitioner’s article reveals that it has no reference whatsoever to the performance of private complainant’s position as a public relations consultant in the Department of Trade and Industry. The article attacked solely the private character of the complainant and delved on matters completely unrelated to his official functions. It cannot therefore fall under the protective coverage of privileged communication-.

5. ID.; ID.; EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN FACT MAY BE SHOWN BY EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. - However, even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that petitioner’s article qualifies under the category of privileged communication, this does not still negative the presence of malice in the instant case. It is well to note that the existence of malice in fact may be shown by extrinsic evidence that the defendant bore a grudge against the offended party, or that there was rivalry or ill-feeling between them which existed at the date of the publication of the defamatory imputation or that the defendant had an intention to injure the reputation of the offended party as shown by the words used and the circumstances attending the publication of the defamatory imputation. The circumstances under which the subject article was published by the petitioner serve to buttress the inference that petitioner was animated solely by revenge towards the private complainant on account of the leaflet entitled “Supalpal si Sazon,” earlier circulated among the homeowners as well as the writings near the entrance gate of the subdivision, all of which petitioner believes to be the handiwork of the private complainant. Furthermore, the words used in the questioned article were mostly uncalled for, strongly sending the message that petitioner’s objective was merely to malign and injure the reputation of the private complainant. This is certainly indicative of malice in fact on the part of the petitioner.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Bito, Lozada, Ortega & Castillo and Esteban B. Nancho for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.