EN BANC
BAYAN,
KARAPATAN,
KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID
NG
PILIPINAS (KMP),
GABRIELA,
Fr. Jose Dizon,
Renato
Constantino, Jr., Froyel
Yaneza,
and Fahima Tajar,
Petitioners,
-
versus - G.R. No. 169838
EDUARDO
ERMITA, in his
capacity
as Executive Secretary,
ATIENZA,
Chief of the Philippine
National
Police, Gen. ARTURO
M.
LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief
Maj.
Gen. VIDAL QUEROL,
and
Western Police District Chief
Gen.
PEDRO BULAONG,
Respondents.
x
------------------------------------------------- x
Jess Del Prado,
Pedro Pinlac,
Carmelita
Morante, Rasti
Delizo, Paul
Bangay, Marie Jo
Ocampo,
Lilia dela Cruz,
Cristeta
Ramos, Adelaida
Ramos,
Mary Grace Gonzales,
Michael
Torres, Rendo
Sabusap,
Precious Balute,
Roxanne
Magboo, Ernie
Bautista,
Joseph de Jesus,
Margarita
Escober,
Djoannalyn Janier,
Quiazon, Ericson
Dizon,
Nenita Cruzat,
Leonardo
De los Reyes,
Pedrito
Fadrigon,
Petitioners,
-
versus - G.R.
No. 169848
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his Present:
official capacity as The Executive
Secretary and in his personal PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
capacity, ANGELO REYES, in his PUNO,*
official capacity as Secretary of QUISUMBING,
the Interior and Local Governments, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
ARTURO LOMIBAO, in his SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
official capacity as the Chief, CARPIO,
Philippine National Police, VIDAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
QUEROL, in his official capacity
as the Chief, National Capital CARPIO MORALES,
Regional Police Office (NCRPO), CALLEJO, SR.,
PEDRO BULAONG, in his official AZCUNA,
capacity as the Chief,
Police District (MPD) AND ALL CHICO-NAZARIO,**
OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS GARCIA,
and
AND PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS VELASCO, JJ.
ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL,
SUPERVISION AND INSTRUCTIONS, Promulgated:
Respondents.
x
-------------------------------------------------- x
KILUSANG
MAYO UNO, represented
by
its Chairperson ELMER C. LABOG
and
Secretary General JOEL
MAGLUNSOD,
NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF LABOR
UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO G.R. No.
169881
(NAFLU-KMU), represented by its
National President, JOSELITO V.
USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL,
SUMILANG, FRANCISCO
LASTRELLA, and ROQUE M. TAN,
Petitioners,
-
versus -
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, PNP DIRECTOR
GENRAL ARTURO LOMIBAO,
HONORABLE MAYOR LITO
ATIENZA, and PNP MPD CHIEF
SUPT. PEDRO BULAONG,
Respondents.
x
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
DECISION
AZCUNA,
J.:
Petitioners come in three groups.
The
first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838,[1]
allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their
rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they
participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen
implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.
The
second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et
al., in G.R. No. 169848,[2]
who allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass
action they held on
The
third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No.
169881,[3]
allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as
organizations and those of their individual members as citizens, specifically
the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the
policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement
it.
KMU,
et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be
conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and
Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of
their members. They further allege that
on
All
petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and
others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of
CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals
of rallies under the “no permit, no rally” policy and the CPR policy recently announced.
B.P.
No. 880, “The Public Assembly Act of 1985,” provides:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880
An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise By The
People Of Their Right Peaceably To Assemble And Petition The Government [And] For
Other Purposes
Be it enacted by
the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled:
Section 1. Title . – This Act shall be known as “The Public Assembly Act of 1985.”
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. – The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of the law.
Sec. 3. Definition of terms. – For purposes of this Act:
(a) “Public assembly” means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances; Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
(b) “Public place” shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access.
(c) “Maximum tolerance” means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.
(d) “Modification of a permit” shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes.
Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required.-- A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.
Sec. 5. Application requirements.-- All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.
Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application. –
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying if in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
Sec. 7. Use of Public throroughfare. – Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for an appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.
Sec. 8. Responsibility of applicant. – It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following:
(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly;
(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be held peacefully;
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit; and
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly.
Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. – Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meters away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.
Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested. – It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of “maximum tolerance” as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.
Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. – No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. – When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. – The following shall constitute violations of the Act:
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf;
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public assembly;
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:
1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;
2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
3. the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.
Sec. 14. Penalties. – Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding section shall be punished as follows:
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six months;
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;
(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days.
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. – Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable “freedom park” or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act.
Sec. 16. Constitutionality.—Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby.
Sec. 17. Repealing clause. – All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.
Sec. 18. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved,
CPR,
on the other hand, is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacañang dated
Malacañang Official
Release No. 2
STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
On Unlawful Mass
Actions
In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government groups to inflame the political situation, sow disorder and incite people against the duty constituted authorities, we have instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a “no permit, no rally” policy, disperse groups that run afoul of this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of the land as well as ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations.
The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force, in lieu of maximum tolerance. The authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of people and inciting them into actions that are inimical to public order, and the peace of mind of the national community.
Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The majority of law-abiding citizens have the right to be protected by a vigilant and proactive government.
We appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in lawful and peaceful conduct befitting of a democratic society.
The President’s call for unity and
reconciliation stands, based on the rule of law.
Petitioners
Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a
violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the
They
argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is
thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a
public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it
does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,”
“protesting or influencing” suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused
by the government. Also, the phrase
“maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against the
government because they are being tolerated.
As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
Petitioners
Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is
unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and
petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise
of that right. It also characterizes
public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows
their dispersal. Thus, its provisions
are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.
Furthermore,
the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. The two standards stated in the laws (clear
and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent.
Regarding
the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the
standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void
for being vague and for lack of publication.
Finally,
petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no
limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior
requirement of securing a permit. And
even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits
provided are unreasonable: First,
allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a
clear and present danger is too comprehensive.
Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as
certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue
would possibly wane.
As
to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes
action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law,
ordinance or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum
tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a
chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably
assemble.
Respondents
in G.R. No. 169838 are Eduardo Ermita, as Executive Secretary,
Respondents
in G.R. No. 169848 are Eduardo Ermita as Executive Secretary and
in his personal capacity; Angelo Reyes, as Secretary of the Interior and
Local Governments; Arturo Lomibao, as Chief Vidal Querol, as
Chief, NCRPO; Pedro Bulaong, as Chief, MPD, and all other public
officers and private individuals acting under their control, supervision and
instruction.
Respondents
in G.R. No. 169881 are the Honorable Executive Secretary, PNP Director
General Arturo Lomibao, the Honorable Mayor Joselito Atienza, and
PNP MPD Chief Pedro Bulaong.
Respondents
argue that:
1.
Petitioners
have no standing because they have not presented evidence that they had been
“injured, arrested or detained because of the CPR,” and that “those arrested
stand to be charged with violating Batas Pambansa [No.] 880 and other
offenses.”
2.
Neither
B.P. No. 880 nor CPR is void on its face.
Petitioners cannot honestly claim that the time, place and manner regulation
embodied in B.P. No. 880 violates the three-pronged test for such a measure, to
wit: (a) B.P. No. 880 is
content-neutral, i.e., it has no reference to content of regulated
speech; (b) B.P. No. 880 is narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, i.e., the
interest cannot be equally well served by a means that is less intrusive of
free speech interests; and (c) B.P. No. 880 leaves open alternative channels
for communication of the information.[6]
3.
B.P.
No. 880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of the law. Section 5 requires the statement of the
public assembly’s time, place and manner of conduct. It entails traffic re-routing to prevent
grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow
of commerce and trade. Furthermore,
nothing in B.P. No. 880 authorizes the denial of a permit on the basis of a
rally’s program content or the statements of the speakers therein, except under
the constitutional precept of the “clear and present danger test.” The status of B.P. No. 880 as a
content-neutral regulation has been recognized in Osmeña v. Comelec.[7]
4.
Adiong v. Comelec[8] held that B.P. No. 880 is a
content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public
assemblies and the law passes the test for such regulation, namely, these
regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to support them.
5.
Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court[9] held that a local chief executive
has the authority to exercise police power to meet “the demands of the common
good in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience.” Furthermore, the discretion given to the
mayor is narrowly circumscribed by Sections 5 (d), and 6 (a), (b), (c), (d),
(e), 13 and 15 of the law.
6.
The
standards set forth in the law are not inconsistent. “Clear and convincing evidence that the public
assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety,
public convenience, public morals or public health” and “imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil” both express the meaning of the “clear and
present danger test.”[10]
7.
CPR
is simply the responsible and judicious use of means allowed by existing laws
and ordinances to protect public interest and restore public order. Thus, it is not accurate to call it a new
rule but rather it is a more pro-active and dynamic enforcement of existing
laws, regulations and ordinances to prevent chaos in the streets. It does not replace the rule of maximum
tolerance in B.P. No. 880.
Respondent Mayor Joselito Atienza,
for his part, submitted in his Comment that the petition in G.R. No. 169838
should be dismissed on the ground that Republic Act No. 7160 gives the Mayor
power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880; that his denials of
permits were under the “clear and present danger” rule as there was a clamor to
stop rallies that disrupt the economy and to protect the lives of other people;
that J. B. L. Reyes v. Bagatsing,[11]
Primicias v. Fugoso,[12]
and Jacinto v. CA,[13]
have affirmed the constitutionality of requiring a permit; that the permit is
for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights;
and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all
rallies.
The petitions were ordered
consolidated on
1. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12 13(a) and 14(a) thereof, and Republic Act No. 7160:
(a) Are these content-neutral or content-based regulations?
(b) Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness?
(c) Do they constitute prior restraint?
(d) Are they undue delegations of powers to Mayors?
(e) Do they violate international human rights treaties and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
2. On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR):
(a) Is the policy void on its face or due to vagueness?
(b) Is it void for lack of publication?
(c) Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the rallies of September 26 and October 4, 5 and 6, 2005?
During the course of the oral
arguments, the following developments took place and were approved and/or noted
by the Court:
1.
Petitioners,
in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions
of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue
of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of
September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
2.
The
Solicitor General agreed with the observation of the Chief Justice that CPR
should no longer be used as a legal term inasmuch as, according to respondents,
it was merely a “catchword” intended to clarify what was thought to be a
misunderstanding of the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880 and
that, as stated in the affidavit executed by Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita
and submitted to the Ombudsman, it does not replace B.P. No. 880 and the
maximum tolerance policy embodied in that law.
The Court will now proceed to address
the principal issues, taking into account the foregoing developments.
Petitioners’ standing cannot be
seriously challenged. Their right as
citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as
guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which
requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nation’s streets
and parks. They have, in fact, purposely
engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their claim
that no such permit can be validly required without violating the
Constitutional guarantee. Respondents,
on the other hand, have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed
the public assemblies held without the permit.